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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LAYTON HARRIS and
PEARL A. HARRIS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

EULA TILLEY,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.

12619

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs brought action against the Defendant in
District Court case No. 188517 to recover amounts expended and the value of obligations incurred in maintaining certain real property of the Defendant and further, for an equitable lien against said real property to
secure the payment of the Defendant's indebtedness to
them. The trial court awarded Plaintiffs a judgment in
the amount of the indebtedness, together with an equitable mortgage to secure that indebtedness. The Defendant
appealed to this court on issues neither relevant nor subject of this appeal, and the lower court was affirmed.
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Plaintiffs sued in District Court case No. 192613 to fore.
close their equitable mortgage whereupon the
'
Y were
awarded a decree of foreclosure and the property was
sold at Sheriff's sale. Defendant duly filed her claim for
a homestead exemption and moved the court to determine
that the Plaintiffs' equitable mortgage was subject to
her homestead exemption.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT
The lower court rendered its conclusions of law and
judgment on July 27, 1971, determining that the equitable mortgage given by the Defendant was not within the
scope of Sections 28-1-1 and 78-23-3, Utah Code Anno·
tated, 1953, and that Defendants giving of said equitable
mortgage did not constitute a waiver and relinquishment
of her right to claim a homestead exemption incident to
the foreclosure of that mortgage.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of that judgment entered
July 27, 1971, and a determination that the Defendants
giving of an equitable mortgage to Plaintiffs constituted
a waiver and relinquishment of her right to claim a home·
stead exemption incident to Plaintiffs' foreclosure of that
mortgage.
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS

In 1964, Plantiffs orally agreed to oversee and man·
age the rental of Defendant's residence at 1968 South 8th
2

in Salt Like City, Utah.
(R. 74, 75) In approximately October of 1965, the Defendant requested the
Plaintiff, Layton Harris, to co-sign with her on a promissory note pursuant to her obtaining a loan to pay accrued
and unpaid general real property taxes and to install a
new roof and furnace in the residence situate on the subject property. (R. 75, 90, 100, 116) Said Plaintiff agreed
ro cu-sign the note conditional upon the Defendant giving
him il quit claim deed to the subject property to protect
him in the event of the Defendant's default on the note.
(R. 7 5) The Defendant obtained a loan from First Federal Savings and Loan Association on October 5, 1965
(R. 77, 91, 100) pursuant to which Layton Harris cosigned with her on a promissory note in the amount of
the luan (R. 77, 102) and the Defendant gave Plaintiffs
a quit claim deed to the subject property. (R. 102)

fast,

The trial court determined that the quit claim deed
had been given to Plaintiffs to secure Defendant's payment to them of amounts they incurred in managing and
maintaining the subject property for the Defendant and
in making installment payments on the promissory note.
The court therefore adjudged the deed to be an equitable
mortgage. ( R. 5)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT THE GIVING OF AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE ON REAL PROPERTY DID NOT CONSTITUTE A W AIYER AND RELINQUISHMENT OF THE

MORTGAGOR'S RIGHT TO CLAIM A HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION INCIDENT TO THE FORECLOSURE
OF THAT MORTGAGE.
Plaintiffs recognize that the homestead exempt'ton,
as constitutionally created, arises immediately upon the
qualification of the head of the family, but submit that
the exemption may be successfully raised against subsequent obligations and liens only if not previously waived
or relinquished.
At 40 Am. Jur. 2d, Homestead, it is recognized that:
"In the absence of constitutional or statutory re·
strictions, the owner of a homestead may mort·
gage the property, and thereby subject it to sale
under foreclosure proceedings." Sec. 115
"Waiver may generally be done in a deed or mort·
gage." Section 192
Neither Article XXII, Sec. 1 of the Utah Constitu·
tion, wherein the homestead exemption is created, nor
any statute of this State, prohibits the conveyance or mort·
gaging of homestead property. Rather, at Section 28·1-l,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, it is provided:
"A homestead consisting of land, appurtenances
and improvements, . . . shall be exempt from
judgment lien and from execution or forced sale,
except upon the following obligations: . · · (2)
Judgments obtained on debts secured by lauful
mortgage on the premises and on deb.ts created for
the purchase price thereof." (Emphasis added)
It is further provided at Section 78-23-3, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953:
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''No article or species of property mentioned in
this chapter or in the title Homesteads is exempt
from execution issued upon a judgment recovered
for its purchase price, or any portion thereof, or
upon a judgment on foreclosure of a mortgage or
other valid lien thereon, . . . ." (Emphasis added)
In Tanner v. Lawler, 6 U 2d 84, 305 P. 2d 882, this
court recognized the application of the Code Section cited
first above and in accord therewith, determined that the
claim of a foreclosing mortgagee is not subject to the
homestead exemption of the mortgagor.
It is clear from statute and judicial precedent, that a

Utah mortgagor is deemed to have waived his homestead
exemption as against his foreclosing mortgagee. The issue
then remaining, is whether this waiver is effectively made
by the giving of an equitable mortgage, or whether it is
limited only to a giving of an instrument which on its
face, constitutes a mortgage at law.
This Court has not been called upon to determine
whether the aforementioned Code Sections contemplate
the giving of an equitable mortgage. The Sections themselves make no attempt to differentiate between legal and
equitable mortgages and Plaintiffs submit that no such
distinction is contemplated nor would be appropriate.
It is noted that the quit claim deed given by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs, and which the lower court has
construed as a mortgage, did not specifically provide for
nor recite a waiver of Defendant's homestead. However,
such a provision or recital in the instrument is not neces-
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sary in order to effect a waiver of the homestead
.
.
.
exemp.
tton. The heremabove cited Code Sections 28-1-1 and 78 .
23-3, specifically provide that a judgment obtained on
foreclosure of a mortgage takes priority over the home.
stead exemption of the mortgagor. In addition, Section
57-1-14, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth an ap.
proved form of a statutory mortgage, which form is notable for its complete absence of any specific provision
with reference to the mortgagor's homestead exemption.
Said Section, in making reference to the form therein
suggested, further provides:
"Such mortgage when executed as required by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance of the land
therein described, together, with all the rights,
privileges and appurtenances thereunder belong·
ing, to the mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal
representatives, as security for the payment of the
indebtedness therein set forth, . . . . " (Emphasis
added)
This section obviously contemplates the pledge of any and
all interests of the mortgagor. No provision is made for
an implied reservation of the homestead interest. This
court in Bybee v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P. 2d 118,
in construing former Section 78-1-13, Utah Code Anno·
tated, 1943, which Section was identical to the subject
present Section, determined that the statutory form need
not be followed, but is only a suggested form. The Coutt
has further recognized in Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186,
117 P. 232, that a deed absolute in form, executed and de·
livered as a security rather than a conveyance of title, will
· t h ere f ore appa rent that
be construed as a mortgage. It ts
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Utah law does not require a waiver of homestead to be
cxpres~ly recited in the mortgage instrument in order for
that waiver to be effective.
The lower court determined from the evidence deduced at trial, that Plaintiffs and Defendants intended that
the quit claim deed delivered by Defendant to Plaintiffs
was to secure any indebtedness incurred by Defendant
and owed to Plaintiffs incident to the Plaintiffs' management of the Defendant's subject property and therefore, that it was an equitable mortgage rather than an
absolute conveyance of title. The record shows there to
have been a voluntary delivery of that document. The
court determined that a mortgage was thereby intended
and therefore, it follows that the giving of that mortgage
was a voluntary act of the Defendant. In other words, the
Defendant incurred the mortgage no less voluntarily than
had she done so by the delivery of a statutory mortgage.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the parties
had discussed the homestead to which Defendant may
have been entitled and it is doubtful that Plaintiffs would
have accepted any mortgage wherein the homestead was
expressly exempted.
The lower court, invoking its equitable jurisdiction,
determined that the Defendant intended to give Plaintiffs
a mortgage. There was nothing before the court to indicate that Defendant intended to give Plaintiffs any right
or interest less than that which she would have given had
she executed and delivered a statutory mortgage. The risk
assumed by Plaintiffs incident to co-signing Defendant's
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promissory note was no less than it would have been had
they been given a statutory mortgage by Defendant to
secure performance on the note Therefore it was ·
·
'
incon.
sistent for the lower court to grant Plaintiffs a mortgagees'
interest any less than that which they would have held
under a statutory mortgage.
The Kansas Court in Hill v. Hill, 185 Kan. 389, 345
P. 2d 1015, was confronted with the question of whether
an equitable mortgage was subject to a claimed homestead exemption. Therein said case, it was found that the
Plaintiffs had loaned money to Defendant's husband to be
used in purchasing certain real estate. In return for the
loan, Defendant's husband gave a promissory note to
Plaintiffs wherein it provided that Plaintiffs were to have
an interest in the purchase of property to the extent of the
amount of that loan. Defendant's husband died and the
real property passed to the Defendant as surviving joint
tenant. Plaintiffs thereafter sued Defendant requesting
the court to determine that the note represented an equit·
able mortgage on the property which they were entitled
to foreclose. The court held:
"Money borrowed from a third person by the p~·
chaser of a homestead, and paid to the vendor, is
purchase-money for which the purchased prope!cy
is liable to such third person where the transact~on
between the parties to the lending transactton
contemplates security for the obligation. The pur·
chase-money mortgage arising from such trans·
action takes priority over the homestead exemp·
tion . . . and it matters not that such purchase·
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money mortgage may be an equitable mortgage."
(Emphasis Added) 345 P. 2d 1024
The Kansas Court was confronted with a purchase
money mortgage rather than a mortgage, which as in the
instant case, was given to secure a loan obtained after the
property had been purchased. The ruling of that court is
nevertheless relevant, since the Utah Code Sections hereinabove cited, make the homestead exemption subject to a
foreclosure of a mortgage regardless of whether that
mortgage secures a debt created for the purchase price of
the property or otherwise. Therefore, there is no reason
to distinguish between an equitable mortgage as in the
case at bar and an equitable mortgage given to secure
purchase money. Equity has re-vested the Defendant with
title to the property subject of this proceeding, and given
Plaintiffs only a mortgage to secure the obligations which
they have assumed incident to their agreement with the
Defendant. Equity surely was not served when the lower
court determined the Plaintiffs' mortgage interest to be
less than that which they would have enjoyed had they
taken a statutory mortgage. Such determination prevented the Plaintiffs from recouping the full amount of the
obligation owed to them by the Defendant. Such recoupment was obviously intended as is evidenced by the giving and acceptance of the equitable mortgage.
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that pursuant to the
voluntary giving of the equitable mortgage, subject hereof, Defendant has waived any homestead exemption vest-
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ed in her at the date that said mortgage was given and
therefore, that the lower court judgment of July 27, 1971
should be reversed and the court directed to enter its
order directing that the homestead of the Defendant is
subject to the foreclosure of Plaintiffs' mortgage lien.
Respectfully submitted,

BETTILYON & HOW ARD
GARY A. WESTON
3 3 3 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants,
Layton Harris and Pearl A. Harris
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